

ONLINE APPENDIX

“Systematic Measurement Error in Election Violence Data”

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British Journal of Political Science (2018)

Descriptive Statistics

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Appendix Table A1: Descriptive Statistics – Malawi

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
MEMS pre-election violence	0.219	0.414	0	1	192
MEMS post-election violence	0.042	0.200	0	1	192
ACLED pre-election violence	0.036	0.187	0	1	193
ACLED post-election violence	0.016	0.124	0	1	193
SCAD pre-election violence	0.010	0.102	0	1	193
SCAD post-election violence	0.005	0.072	0	1	193
ACLED/SCAD combined pre-el. violence	0.041	0.200	0	1	193
ACLED/SCAD combined post-el. violence	0.016	0.124	0	1	193
Underreporting ACLED pre-el. violence	0.203	0.403	0	1	192
Underreporting ACLED post-el. violence	0.036	0.188	0	1	192
Underreporting SCAD pre-el. violence	0.214	0.411	0	1	192
Underreporting SCAD post-el. violence	0.036	0.188	0	1	192
Underreporting ACLED/SCAD combined pre-el. viol.	0.203	0.403	0	1	192
Underreporting ACLED/SCAD combined post-el. viol.	0.036	0.188	0	1	192
Consistency ACLED pre-election violence	0.772	0.421	0	1	193
Consistency ACLED post-election violence	0.948	0.222	0	1	193
Consistency SCAD pre-election violence	0.777	0.417	0	1	193
Consistency SCAD post-election violence	0.959	0.200	0	1	193
Consistency ACLED/SCAD combined pre-el. viol.	0.793	0.406	0	1	193
Consistency ACLED/SCAD combined post-el. viol.	0.959	0.200	0	1	193
Population density	37.018	78.172	1.710	772.117	192
History of election violence	0.031	0.202	0	2	193
Vote margin Presidential election	0.452	0.241	0.005	0.922	182
Literacy	0.727	0.136	0.381	0.991	192
Electrification	0.053	0.106	0	0.662	192
Urbanization	3.015	0.922	0.997	6.65	192
Night lights	0.052	0.216	0	1.917	193
Democracy	6.000	0.000	6	6	193
Competition	0.548	0.241	0.078	0.995	182

Appendix Table A2: Descriptive Statistics – Zambia

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
ZEMS pre-election violence	0.513	0.501	0	1	156
ZEMS post-election violence	0.090	0.287	0	1	156
ACLED pre-election violence	0.167	0.374	0	1	156
ACLED post-election violence	0.090	0.287	0	1	156
SCAD pre-election violence	0.006	0.080	0	1	156
SCAD post-election violence	0.006	0.080	0	1	156
ACLED/SCAD combined pre-el. violence	0.167	0.374	0	1	156
ACLED/SCAD combined post-el. violence	0.096	0.296	0	1	156
Underreporting ACLED pre-el. violence	0.404	0.492	0	1	156
Underreporting ACLED post-el. violence	0.051	0.221	0	1	156
Underreporting SCAD pre-el. violence	0.506	0.502	0	1	156
Underreporting SCAD post-el. violence	0.083	0.277	0	1	156
Underreporting ACLED/SCAD combined pre-el. viol.	0.404	0.492	0	1	156
Underreporting ACLED/SCAD combined post-el. viol.	0.045	0.208	0	1	156
Consistency ACLED pre-election violence	0.538	0.500	0	1	156
Consistency ACLED post-election violence	0.897	0.304	0	1	156
Consistency SCAD pre-election violence	0.494	0.502	0	1	156
Consistency SCAD post-election violence	0.917	0.277	0	1	156
Consistency ACLED/SCAD combined pre-el. viol.	0.596	0.492	0	1	156
Consistency ACLED/SCAD combined post-el. viol.	0.955	0.208	0	1	156
Population density	30.804	114.082	0.129	782.059	156
History of election violence	0.179	0.475	0	2	156
Vote margin presidential election 2015	0.582	0.236	0.019	0.974	156
Vote margin presidential election 2016	0.560	0.241	0.001	0.964	156
Literacy	0.668	0.121	0.398	0.921	156
Electrification	0.149	0.213	0	0.835	156
Urbanization	1.610	1.424	0.122	6.663	156
Night lights	0.032	0.138	0	0.982	156
Democracy	7.000	0.000	7	7	156
Competition	0.418	0.236	0.026	0.981	156

Appendix Table A3: Replicating Table 2 with Lusaka included

	ACLED Data		SCAD Data		ACLED/SCAD combined	
	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population density	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
History of election violence	0.096 (0.603)	0.016 (0.523)	0.442 (0.593)	-0.242 (0.265)	0.096 (0.603)	0.068 (0.593)
Literacy	-0.884 (2.730)	8.117*** (2.982)	1.814 (2.295)	8.012* (4.593)	-0.884 (2.730)	6.544** (3.050)
Electrification	0.688 (1.426)	-2.422 (2.161)	-0.417 (1.272)	0.276 (5.775)	0.688 (1.426)	-2.022 (1.807)
Vote margin presidential election	0.743 (0.994)	1.342 (4.085)	0.708 (0.896)	4.752 (6.373)	0.743 (0.994)	0.495 (3.666)
Constant	-0.371 (1.257)	-9.070*** (2.648)	-1.645 (1.097)	-11.023*** (3.428)	-0.371 (1.257)	-7.701*** (2.355)
Observations	156	156	156	156	156	156
AIC	221.28	70.80	223.90	89.14	221.28	65.75
BIC	239.58	89.10	242.20	107.44	239.58	84.05
LL	-104.64	-29.40	-105.95	-38.57	-104.64	-26.88

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A4: Replicating Tables 1/2 with pooled data (both countries)

	ACLED Data		SCAD Data		ACLED/SCAD combined	
	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population density	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.038*** (0.014)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.046*** (0.012)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.034*** (0.012)
History of election violence	-0.069 (0.630)	0.986*** (0.216)	0.100 (0.587)	0.213 (0.255)	-0.069 (0.630)	1.237*** (0.197)
Literacy	-0.390 (0.941)	4.986* (2.964)	0.427 (1.283)	6.232** (3.072)	-0.390 (0.941)	4.282 (2.731)
Electrification	0.971 (0.650)	-0.968 (2.604)	0.958 (1.372)	2.917 (3.579)	0.971 (0.650)	-1.454 (2.597)
Vote margin presidential election	0.621 (0.568)	3.712 (2.491)	0.652 (0.420)	5.873* (3.407)	0.621 (0.568)	3.101 (2.186)
Constant	-0.692 (0.487)	-9.287*** (2.230)	-0.885 (0.687)	-11.041*** (3.305)	-0.692 (0.487)	-8.752*** (1.658)
Observations	324	324	324	324	324	324
AIC	386.56	99.37	399.18	120.43	386.56	93.70
BIC	413.02	125.84	425.65	146.90	413.02	120.16
LL	-186.28	-42.69	-192.59	-53.22	-186.28	-39.85

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A5: Replicating Table 1 without vote margin

	ACLED Data		SCAD Data		ACLED/SCAD combined	
	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population density	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.028** (0.013)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.028** (0.013)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.028** (0.013)
History of election violence	-1.358*** (0.505)	2.492*** (0.283)	-1.786** (0.764)	2.492*** (0.283)	-1.358*** (0.505)	2.492*** (0.283)
Literacy	-0.455 (1.237)	2.226 (3.147)	-0.403 (1.437)	2.226 (3.147)	-0.455 (1.237)	2.226 (3.147)
Electrification	7.796*** (1.773)	-0.130 (2.175)	7.508*** (0.204)	-0.130 (2.175)	7.796*** (1.773)	-0.130 (2.175)
Constant	-1.067 (1.163)	-4.464* (2.390)	-1.207 (1.245)	-4.464* (2.390)	-1.067 (1.163)	-4.464* (2.390)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192
AIC	193.52	58.96	196.46	58.96	193.52	58.96
BIC	200.03	65.47	202.98	65.47	200.03	65.47
LL	-94.76	-27.48	-96.23	-27.48	-94.76	-27.48

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A6: Replicating Table 2 without vote margin

	ACLED Data		SCAD Data		ACLED/SCAD combined	
	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population density	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.067** (0.029)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.035** (0.015)	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.062** (0.030)
History of election violence	-0.099 (0.739)	0.469* (0.267)	0.155 (0.648)	-0.438** (0.197)	-0.099 (0.739)	0.788*** (0.271)
Literacy	-0.562 (2.192)	12.397*** (2.765)	2.069 (1.754)	12.070*** (2.612)	-0.562 (2.192)	9.633*** (2.676)
Electrification	1.129 (1.311)	-7.121*** (1.673)	0.266 (1.101)	-3.664** (1.799)	1.129 (1.311)	-6.791*** (1.488)
Constant	-0.097 (1.351)	-10.978*** (2.490)	-1.352 (1.103)	-10.172*** (2.413)	-0.097 (1.351)	-9.542*** (2.393)
Observations	142	142	142	142	142	142
AIC	196.00	43.25	202.27	71.80	196.00	36.93
BIC	210.78	58.02	217.05	86.58	210.78	51.71
LL	-93.00	-16.62	-96.14	-30.90	-93.00	-13.46

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A7: Replicating Table 1 without population

	ACLED Data		SCAD Data		ACLED/SCAD combined	
	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election
	1	2	3	4	5	6
History of election violence	-0.585 (0.554)	2.651*** (0.395)	-1.230 (0.807)	2.651*** (0.395)	-0.585 (0.554)	2.651*** (0.395)
Vote margin Presidential election	0.041 (1.722)	0.524 (1.909)	0.048 (1.546)	0.524 (1.909)	0.041 (1.722)	0.524 (1.909)
Literacy	-0.433 (1.434)	3.102 (3.338)	-0.471 (1.553)	3.102 (3.338)	-0.433 (1.434)	3.102 (3.338)
Electrification	1.763*** (0.419)	-8.147*** (1.746)	3.999*** (1.434)	-8.147*** (1.746)	1.763*** (0.419)	-8.147*** (1.746)
Constant	-1.119** (0.475)	-5.589*** (1.825)	-1.155* (0.604)	-5.589*** (1.825)	-1.119** (0.475)	-5.589*** (1.825)
Observations	182	182	182	182	182	182
AIC	189.70	59.27	190.86	59.27	189.70	59.27
BIC	196.11	65.67	197.27	65.67	196.11	65.67
LL	-92.85	-27.63	-93.43	-27.63	-92.85	-27.63

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A8: Replicating Table 2 without population

	ACLED Data		SCAD Data		ACLED/SCAD combined	
	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election
	1	2	3	4	5	6
History of election violence	0.044 (0.793)	1.947*** (0.571)	0.297 (0.675)	0.188 (0.462)	0.044 (0.793)	2.413*** (0.629)
Vote margin presidential election	1.574* (0.926)	35.256*** (7.248)	1.423* (0.832)	34.509*** (8.237)	1.574* (0.926)	37.111*** (7.237)
Literacy	-1.808 (2.574)	-4.006 (3.087)	1.009 (1.939)	-5.339** (2.175)	-1.808 (2.574)	-5.976* (3.418)
Electrification	0.906 (1.469)	19.806*** (5.368)	-0.131 (1.247)	24.903*** (5.243)	0.906 (1.469)	20.431*** (5.932)
Constant	-0.392 (1.271)	-32.042*** (6.718)	-1.645 (1.245)	-29.463*** (7.158)	-0.392 (1.271)	-32.901*** (6.855)
Observations	142	142	142	142	142	142
AIC	195.18	29.77	202.41	40.90	195.18	26.18
BIC	209.96	44.55	217.19	55.68	209.96	40.96
LL	-92.59	-9.89	-96.21	-15.45	-92.59	-8.09

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A9: Replicating Table 1 with any violence type data

	ACLED Data		SCAD Data		ACLED/SCAD combined	
	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population density	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.033*** (0.008)
History of election violence	-1.445*** (0.518)	2.316*** (0.286)	-1.824** (0.798)	2.316*** (0.286)	-1.445*** (0.518)	2.316*** (0.286)
Vote margin Presidential election	0.369 (1.899)	1.131 (2.028)	0.159 (1.529)	1.131 (2.028)	0.369 (1.899)	1.131 (2.028)
Literacy	-0.473 (1.220)	2.525 (2.903)	-0.618 (1.490)	2.525 (2.903)	-0.473 (1.220)	2.525 (2.903)
Electrification	8.451*** (0.236)	1.720 (3.685)	7.765*** (0.986)	1.720 (3.685)	8.451*** (0.236)	1.720 (3.685)
Constant	-1.246*** (0.228)	-5.141*** (1.565)	-1.105** (0.556)	-5.141*** (1.565)	-1.246*** (0.228)	-5.141*** (1.565)
Observations	182	182	182	182	182	182
AIC	183.32	58.04	189.05	58.04	183.32	58.04
BIC	189.73	64.44	195.46	64.44	189.73	64.44
LL	-89.66	-27.02	-92.52	-27.02	-89.66	-27.02

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A10: Replicating Table 2 with any violence type data

	ACLED Data		SCAD Data		ACLED/SCAD combined	
	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election	pre-election	post-election
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population density	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.212*** (0.022)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.092*** (0.016)
History of election violence	0.017 (0.764)	2.027*** (0.535)	0.240 (0.669)	0.535 (0.369)	0.017 (0.764)	2.359*** (0.594)
Literacy	-1.441 (2.617)	-1.238 (2.946)	1.108 (1.975)	-4.311* (2.380)	-1.441 (2.617)	-4.853 (3.304)
Electrification	1.607 (1.579)	25.241*** (6.161)	0.673 (1.308)	26.875*** (5.223)	1.607 (1.579)	23.554*** (7.096)
Vote margin presidential election 2015	1.518* (0.922)		1.222 (0.799)		1.518* (0.922)	
Vote margin presidential election 2016		37.553*** (8.078)		35.440*** (8.707)		37.752*** (7.976)
Constant	-0.605 (1.315)	-35.778*** (7.525)	-1.562 (1.244)	-31.025*** (7.795)	-0.605 (1.315)	-34.167*** (7.613)
Observations	142	142	142	142	142	142
AIC	194.20	31.22	202.16	42.30	194.20	28.07
BIC	211.94	48.95	219.90	60.03	211.94	45.81
LL	-91.10	-9.61	-95.08	-15.15	-91.10	-8.04

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A11: Replicating Table 3 with any violence type data

	M/ZEMS	ACLED	SCAD	ACLED/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.190 (0.240)	0.313** (0.136)	0.837** (0.349)	0.236* (0.138)
Night lights	0.357 (0.797)	1.070** (0.505)	1.511** (0.730)	2.233*** (0.651)
Democracy	1.523*** (0.309)	2.142*** (0.580)	0.742 (0.773)	2.071*** (0.644)
Competition	-0.430 (0.678)	0.632** (0.275)	-3.906 (4.873)	0.594** (0.259)
Constant	-10.743*** (2.214)	-17.198*** (4.095)	-10.580** (4.947)	-16.587*** (4.588)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	415.11	230.75	40.23	228.67
BIC	434.23	249.87	59.35	247.78
LL	-202.56	-110.38	-15.12	-109.33

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure A1: Replicating Table 3: Urbanization coefficients using monitor vs. media data





Figure A2: Replicating Table 3: Night lights coefficients using monitor vs. media data



Label	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Estimator	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Country Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓
Region Clustered Standard Errors	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓

Appendix Table A12: Replicating Table 3
without clustered SEs

	M/ZEMS	ACLED	SCAD	ACLED/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.190 (0.136)	0.478** (0.202)	0.824** (0.388)	0.401* (0.206)
Night lights	0.357 (0.805)	0.686 (1.044)	1.631 (1.287)	1.820** (0.886)
Democracy	1.523*** (0.305)	2.290*** (0.490)	-0.057 (1.319)	2.214*** (0.515)
Competition	-0.430 (0.525)	-0.322 (1.020)	-3.484 (5.493)	-0.369 (1.044)
Constant	-10.743*** (2.198)	-18.445*** (3.521)	-5.991 (9.481)	-17.794*** (3.707)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	415.11	190.79	33.38	189.80
BIC	434.23	209.90	52.49	208.91
LL	-202.56	-90.39	-11.69	-89.90

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A13: Replicating Table 3
with country fixed effects but without clustered SEs

	M/ZEMS	ACLED	SCAD	ACLED/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.190 (0.136)	0.478** (0.202)	0.824** (0.388)	0.401* (0.206)
Night lights	0.357 (0.805)	0.686 (1.044)	1.631 (1.287)	1.820** (0.886)
Competition	-0.430 (0.525)	-0.322 (1.020)	-3.484 (5.493)	-0.369 (1.044)
Constant	-0.082 (0.308)	-2.418*** (0.475)	-6.392*** (0.625)	-2.297*** (0.465)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	415.11	190.79	33.38	189.80
BIC	434.23	209.90	52.49	208.91
LL	-202.56	-90.39	-11.69	-89.90

Notes: Logit models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A14: Replicating Table 3
with country fixed effects and clustered SEs

	M/ZEMS	ACLED	SCAD	ACLED/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.190 (0.240)	0.478** (0.210)	0.824** (0.390)	0.401* (0.220)
Night lights	0.357 (0.797)	0.686 (0.453)	1.631** (0.690)	1.820** (0.735)
Competition	-0.430 (0.678)	-0.322 (0.659)	-3.484 (6.132)	-0.369 (0.744)
Constant	-0.082 (0.252)	-2.418*** (0.394)	-6.392*** (1.107)	-2.297*** (0.392)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	415.11	190.79	33.38	189.80
BIC	434.23	209.90	52.49	208.91
LL	-202.56	-90.39	-11.69	-89.90

Notes: Logit models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A15: Replicating Table 3
with OLS

	M/ZEMS	ACLED	SCAD	ACLED/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.041 (0.051)	0.062** (0.020)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.049** (0.022)
Night lights	0.074 (0.172)	0.086 (0.097)	0.184** (0.063)	0.295* (0.149)
Democracy	0.336*** (0.073)	0.216*** (0.034)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.196*** (0.041)
Competition	-0.081 (0.139)	0.004 (0.043)	-0.021 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.047)
Constant	-1.871*** (0.517)	-1.452*** (0.256)	0.055 (0.098)	-1.294*** (0.313)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	435.12	102.18	-675.02	99.60
BIC	454.24	121.29	-655.91	118.71
LL	-212.56	-46.09	342.51	-44.80

Notes: OLS models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A16: Replicating Table 3
with OLS but without clustered SEs

	M/ZEMS	ACLEDD	SCAD	ACLEDD/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.041 (0.029)	0.062** (0.024)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.049** (0.024)
Night lights	0.074 (0.187)	0.086 (0.176)	0.184 (0.148)	0.295** (0.133)
Democracy	0.336*** (0.063)	0.216*** (0.052)	-0.006 (0.023)	0.196*** (0.051)
Competition	-0.081 (0.107)	0.004 (0.069)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.069)
Constant	-1.871*** (0.455)	-1.452*** (0.381)	0.055 (0.177)	-1.294*** (0.375)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	435.12	102.18	-675.02	99.60
BIC	454.24	121.29	-655.91	118.71
LL	-212.56	-46.09	342.51	-44.80

Notes: OLS models with robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A17: Replicating Table 3
with OLS, country fixed effects but without clustered SEs

	M/ZEMS	ACLED	SCAD	ACLED/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.041 (0.029)	0.062** (0.024)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.049** (0.024)
Night lights	0.074 (0.187)	0.086 (0.176)	0.184 (0.148)	0.295** (0.133)
Competition	-0.081 (0.107)	0.004 (0.069)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.069)
Constant	0.297*** (0.082)	-0.054 (0.061)	0.016 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.059)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	433.12	100.18	-677.02	97.60
BIC	448.42	115.47	-661.73	112.89
LL	-212.56	-46.09	342.51	-44.80

Notes: OLS models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A18: Replicating Table 3 with OLS,
country fixed effects and clustered SEs

	M/ZEMS	ACLEd	SCAD	ACLEd/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.041 (0.051)	0.062** (0.020)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.049** (0.022)
Night lights	0.074 (0.172)	0.086 (0.097)	0.184** (0.063)	0.295* (0.149)
Competition	-0.081 (0.139)	0.004 (0.043)	-0.021 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.047)
Constant	0.297*** (0.071)	-0.054 (0.053)	0.016 (0.021)	-0.025 (0.058)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	433.12	100.18	-677.02	97.60
BIC	448.42	115.47	-661.73	112.89
LL	-212.56	-46.09	342.51	-44.80

Notes: OLS models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Information on Case Selection and Representativeness

Our selected countries – Malawi and Zambia – are representative of African countries in terms of election violence level and drivers, and thus allow for generalizability. With respect to the level of election violence, both Malawi and Zambia are fairly typical for Africa,¹ with Zambia in 2016 exhibiting somewhat higher levels than Malawi. This insight is also supported by V-Dem data² and illustrated in Appendix Figure A3: both countries have average levels of election violence, with Zambia slightly above and Malawi slightly below average. They are also in the most common group of “sporadic” government violence and “isolated” non-government violence, as shown in Appendix Figure A4. Our two countries are also very close to the African average on physical violence more broadly (Appendix Figure A5). In contrast to much research on election violence, our study does not build on the few cases of extreme levels of election violence, such as Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya or Nigeria.

The two countries are also representative of other African countries in terms of election violence drivers. In one of the most comprehensive studies of cross-national variation in electoral violence in Africa, Fjelde and Höglund (2016a)³ find three factors consistently associated with election violence: level of democracy, population size, and electoral institutions. As figures A6 and A7 in the appendix show, Malawi and Zambia occupy the African middle ground on several relevant dimensions, including democracy and population size, geographic area, and press freedom/media censorship. The latter is likely to create systematic measurement error in media reporting. With respect to electoral institutions, Malawi and Zambia have presidential systems (like 85% of African democracies) and Single Member District (SMD) elections (like 45% of African democracies).⁴ According to Fjelde and Hglund (2016a), SMD electoral systems are more conducive to violence than electoral systems with higher district magnitude.


¹Straus S and Taylor C. 2012. Democratization and Election Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008. in Bekoe D (Ed.) Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington D.C.: USIP, 15-38.

²Coppedge M, Gerring J, Lindberg S.I, Skanning S-E, Teorell J and Altman D. 2016. V-dem Codebook, v6. Varieties of Democracy Project.

³Fjelde and Höglund. 2016a. Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. British Journal of Political Science, 46(2): 297-320.


⁴Beck T, Clark G, Groff A, Keefer P, and Walsh P. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. The World Bank Economic Review, 15(1): 165-176.

Figure A3: Average Violence in Sub-Saharan African Elections, 1991-2015



Source: V-Dem Data, Coppedge et al. 2016. Higher values signify higher levels of violence. Mean of Government Violence is 1.13 and mean of Non-Government Violence is 1.39. *Government Violence* concerns whether “opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers [were] subjected to repression, intimidation violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party or their agents” *Non-Government Violence* concerns whether “the campaign period, election day, and post-election process [were] free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)”

Figure A4: Election Violence in Sub-Saharan African Countries
(most recent data, n=48)




Source: V-Dem Data, Coppedge et al. 2016. For variable coding see Figure A1. Malawi and Zambia are in the largest group (n=8) in the center of the graph with “sporadic” government violence and “isolated” non-government violence. We use most recent data available for each country (this varies in V-Dem between 2012 and 2014).

Figure A5: Physical Violence in Sub-Saharan African Countries
(most recent data, n=48)




Source: V-Dem Data, Coppedge et al. 2016. Physical violence varies from 0 to 1, with a mean of 0.60 and a standard deviation of 0.23. Malawi and Zambia are just slightly above the mean, at 0.63 and 0.67, which is the equivalent of a quarter of a standard deviation from the mean. We use most recent data available for each country (this varies in V-Dem between 2012 and 2014).

Figure A6: Democracy and Censorship in Sub-Saharan African Countries
(most recent data, n=48)



Source: V-Dem Data, Coppedge et al. 2016. Malawi and Zambia are in the center of the distribution with solid markers. We use most recent data available for each country (this varies in V-Dem between 2012 and 2014).

Figure A7: Geographic area and population size in Sub-Saharan African Countries
(most recent data, n=48)



Source: V-Dem Data, Coppedge et al. 2016. Malawi and Zambia are in the center of the distribution with solid markers. We use most recent data available for each country (this varies in V-Dem between 2012 and 2014).